Two-player win/lose games of infinite duration are involved in several disciplines including computer science and logic. If such a game has deterministic winning strategies, one may ask how simple such strategies can get. The answer may help with actual implementation, or to win despite imperfect information, or to conceal sensitive information especially if the game is repeated.
Introduction
In this article, two-player win/lose games of infinite duration are games where two players concurrently and deterministically choose one action each at every of infinitely many rounds, and "in the end" exactly one player wins. Such games (especially their simpler, turn-based variant) have been used in various fields ranging from social sciences to computer science and logic, e.g. in automata theory [5, 14] and in descriptive set theory [11] .
Given such a game and a player, a fundamental question is whether she has a winning strategy, i.e. a way to win regardless of her opponent's actions. If the answer is positive, a second fundamental question is whether she has a simple winning strategy. More specifically, this article investigates the following strategy uniformization problem: consider an equivalence relation ∼ over histories, i.e. over sequences of played actions; if a player has a winning strategy, has she a winning ∼-strategy, i.e. a strategy prescribing the same action after equivalent histories? This problem is relevant to imperfect information games and beyond.
This article provides a sufficient condition on ∼ and on the winning condition of a player such that, if she has a winning strategy, she has a winning ∼-strategy. The sufficient condition involves time awareness of the player, but perfect recall (rephrased in Section 2) is not needed. On the one hand, examples show the tightness of the sufficient condition in several directions; on the other hand, other examples show its current limitations.
Furthermore, the proof that the condition is sufficient is fairly constructive: from any winning strategy s, it derives a uniform winning strategy s • f in a Lipschitz continuous manner. The function f takes as an input the true history of actions, and outputs a well-chosen representative, i.e., a dummy history. Strengthening the sufficient condition by assuming perfect recall will render f computable incrementally as the history grows. As a consequence (proved relatively easily), the derivation preserves finiteness of the strategy memory. If not strengthening this sufficient condition, more work and more memory will also ensure preservation of the finiteness of the memory, if the action set of the opponent is finite.
This sufficient condition has an important corollary about concurrent games with states and colors: if any winning condition is defined via the colors, a player who can win can do so by only taking the history of colors and the current state into account. Finiteness of the memory is also preserved, if the action set of the opponent is finite. Moreover, with some Muller winning conditions the occurrence order of the colors can be ignored.
Finding sufficient conditions for strategy uniformization may help reduce the winning strategy search space; or help simplify the notion of strategy: instead of expecting a precise history as an input, it may just expect an equivalence class, e.g. expressed as a simpler trace.
The strategy uniformization problem is also relevant to protagonist-imperfect-information games, where the protagonist cannot distinguish between equivalent histories; and also to antagonist-imperfect-information games, where the protagonist wants to behave the same after as many histories as possible to conceal information from her opponent or anyone (partially) observing her actions: indeed the opponent, though losing, could try to lose in as many ways as possible over repeated plays of the game, to learn the full strategy of Player 1, i.e. her capabilities. In connection with the latter, this article studies the strategy maximal uniformization problem: if there is a winning strategy, is there a maximal ∼ such that there is a winning ∼-strategy? A basic result is proved and examples show its tightness.
Related works
The distinction between perfect and imperfect information was already studied in [15] for finite games. Related concepts were clarified in [9] by using terms such as information partition and perfect recall: this article is meant for a slightly more general setting and thus may use different terminologies.
I am not aware of results similar to my sufficient condition, but there is an extensive literature, starting around [16] , that studies related decision problems: in some class of games, is the existence of a uniform winning strategy decidable and how quickly? Some classes of games come from strategy logic, introduced in [4] and connected to information imperfectness, e.g., in [2] . Some other classes come from dynamic epistemic logic, introduced in [8] and connected to games, e.g., in [18] and to decision procedures, e.g., in [13] . Among these works, some [12] have expressed the need for general frameworks and results about uniform strategies; others [3] have studied subtle differences between types of information imperfectness.
Imperfect information games have been also widely used in the field of security, see e.g. the survey [17, Section 4.2] . The aforementioned strategy maximal uniformatization problem could be especially relevant in this context.
Structure of the article Section 2 presents the main results about the strategy uniformization problem; Section 3 presents corollaries about games with states and colors; Section 4 proves the main result and a corollary under the stronger assumption that yields stronger conclusion; Sections 5 and 6 prove the main result and two corollaries under the weaker assumption that yields weaker conclusion, respectively in the general case and in the memory-aware case; Section 7 discusses notions used in the main results as well as alternative notions; Section 8 shows the tightness of the sufficient condition in several directions; finally, Section 9 presents basic results for the strategy maximal uniformization problem and examples showing some tightness.
Main definitions and results
The end of this section discusses many aspects of the forthcoming definitions and results.
Definitions on game theory In this article, a two-player win/lose game is a tuple A 1 , A 2 , W where A 1 and A 2 are non-empty sets and W is a subset of infinite sequences over
Informally, Player 1 and Player 2 concurrently choose one action in A 1 and A 2 , respectively, and repeat this ω times. If the produced sequence is in W , Player 1 wins and Player 2 loses, otherwise Player 2 wins and Player 1 loses. So W is called the winning condition (of Player 1).
The histories are the finite sequences over
The runs and opponent-runs are their infinite versions. A Player 1 strategy is a function from A * 2 to A 1 . Informally, it tells Player 1 which action to choose depending on the opponent-histories, i.e. on how Player 2 has played so far.
The induced history function h :
* expects a Player 1 strategy and an opponent-history as inputs, and outputs a history. It is defined inductively:
Informally, h outputs the very sequence of pairs of actions that are chosen if Player 1 follows the given strategy while Player 2 plays the given opponent-history. Note that β → h(s, β) preserves the length and the prefix relation, i.e. ∀β,
. The function h is extended to accept opponent-runs (in A ω 2 ) and then to output runs: h(s, β) is the only run whose prefixes are the h(s, β ≤n ) for n ∈ N, where β ≤n is the prefix of β of length n. A Player 1 strategy s is a winning strategy if h(s, β) ∈ W for all β ∈ A ω 2 .
Definitions on equivalence relations over histories Given a game A 1 , A 2 , W , a strategy constraint (constraint for short) is an equivalence relation over histories. Given a constraint ∼, a strategy s is said to be a ∼-
Informally, a ∼-strategy behaves the same after equivalent histories that are compatible with s.
Useful predicates on constraints, denoted ∼, are defined below.
1. Time awareness: ρ ∼ ρ ′ ⇒ |ρ| = |ρ ′ |, where |ρ| is the length of the sequence/word ρ.
Closedness by adding a suffix
Definitions on automata theory The automata in this article have the classical form (Σ, Q, q 0 , δ) where q 0 ∈ Q and δ : Q × Σ → Q, possibly with additional accepting states F ⊆ Q in the definition. The state space Q may be infinite, though. The transition function is lifted in two ways by induction. First, to compute the current state after reading a word: δ + (ǫ) := q 0 and δ + (ua) := δ(δ + (u), a) for all (u, a) ∈ Σ * × Σ. Second, to compute the sequence of visited states while reading a word: δ ++ (ǫ) := q 0 and δ ++ (ua) = δ ++ (u)δ + (ua). Note that |δ ++ (u)| = |u| for all u ∈ Σ * . Given a game A 1 , A 2 , W , a memory-aware implementation of a strategy s is a tuple (M, m 0 , σ, µ, ) where M is a (in)finite set (the memory), m 0 ∈ M (the initial memory state), σ : M → A 1 (the choice of action depending on the memory state), and µ : M × A 2 → M (the memory update), such that s = σ • µ + , where µ + : A * 2 → M (the "cumulative" memory update) is defined inductively: µ + (ǫ) := m 0 and µ
If M is finite, s is said to be a finite-memory strategy.
Word pairing: for all n ∈ N, for all u, v ∈ Σ n , let u v :
A time-aware constraint is pairwise-regular using (in)finite memory Q, if there is an au-
Note that pairwise regularity of ∼ was called indistinguishability-based in [3] .
Main results Let us recall additional notions first. Two functions of domain Σ * that coincide on inputs of length less than n but differ for some input of length n are said to be at distance 1 2 n . In this context, a map from strategies to strategies (or to A * 2 → A * 2 ) is said to be 1-Lipschitz continuous if from any input strategy that is partially defined for opponent-histories of length up to n, one can partially infer the output strategy for opponent-histories of length up to n. Theorem 1 Consider a game A 1 , A 2 , W and a constraint ∼ that is time-aware and closed by adding a suffix. The two results below are independent.
1. Stronger assumptions and conclusions: If ∼ is also perfectly recalling and weakly W -closed, there exists a 1-Lipschitz continuous map f :
such that for all strategies s, the function f (s), denoted f s , satisfies the following.
• s • f s is a ∼-strategy, and s • f s is winning if s is winning,
• f s preserves the length and the prefix relation,
Furthermore, if a winning strategy has a memory-aware implementation using memory M , and if ∼ is pairwise-regularly recognized by an automaton with accepting states F , there is a winning ∼-strategy whose memory-aware implementation uses memory M × F .
2.
Weaker assumptions (no perfect recall) and conclusions: If ∼ is also strongly Wclosed, there exists a self-map of the Player 1 strategies that is 1-Lipschitz continuous and that maps strategies to ∼-strategies, and winning strategies to winning strategies.
If A 2 is finite, and if ∼ is pairwise-regular using memory M ∼ , and if there exists a winning strategy with memory M s , there is a winning ∼-strategy using memory P(M s × M ∼ ).
Comments on the definitions and results
In the literature, Player 1 strategies sometimes have type (A 1 × A 2 ) * → A 1 . In this article, they have type A * 2 → A 1 instead. Both options would work here, but the latter is simpler.
In the literature, Player 1 winning strategies are sometimes defined as strategies winning against all Player 2 strategies. In this article, they win against all opponent runs instead. Both options would work here, but the latter is simpler.
Consider a game A 1 , A 2 , W and its sequentialized version where Player 1 plays first at each round. It is well-known and easy to show that a Player 1 strategy wins the concurrent version iff she wins the sequential version. I have two reasons to use concurrent games here, though. First, the notation is nicer for the purpose at hand. Second, concurrency does not rule out (semi-)deterministic determinacy of interesting classes of games as in [1] and [10] , and using a sequentialized version of the main result to handle these concurrent games would require cumbersome back-and-forth game sequentialization that would depend on the winner. That being said, most examples in this article are, morally, sequential/turn-based games.
Strong W -closedness is indeed stronger than weak W -closedness, as will be proved. Besides these two properties, which relate ∼ and W , the other predicates on ∼ alone are classical when dealing with information imperfectness (possibly known under different names).
However strong the strong W -closedness may seem, it is strictly weaker than the conjunction of perfect recall and weak W -closedness, as will be proved. This justifies the attributes stronger/weaker assumptions in Theorem 1. Note that the definition of strong W -closedness involves only the implication ρ ∈ W ⇒ ρ ′ ∈ W , as opposed to an equivalence.
The notion of pairwise regularity is natural, but so is the following. An equivalence relation ∼ over Σ * is said to be single-wise regular using memory Q if there exists an automaton (Σ, Q, q 0 , δ) such that u ∼ v iff δ + (u) = δ + (v), so there are at most |Q| equivalence classes. When considering time-aware constraints, pairwise regularity is strictly more general, as will be proved, and it yields more general results. A discussion can also be found in [3] .
Here, the two notions of regularity require nothing about the cardinality of the state space: what matters is the (least) cardinality that suffices. The intention is primarily to invoke the results with finite automata, but allowing for infinite ones is done at no extra cost.
In the memory part of Theorem 1.1, the Cartesian product involves only F , as opposed to the full M ∼ in Theorem 1.2, moreover followed by a powerset construction. So by Cantor's theorem, the memory in Theorem 1.2 increases strictly, despite finiteness assumption for A 2 .
The Lipschitz continuity of s → s • f s in Theorem 1.1 means that it suffices to know the original strategy for opponent-history inputs up to some length to infer the ∼-strategy for the same inputs. In Theorem 1.1, the derived ∼-strategy is of the form s • f s , i.e. it is essentially s with modified inputs. Since the function f s preserves length and the prefix relation, the modified input can be computed incrementally as the opponent-history grows. In Theorem 1.2, the derived ∼-strategy has a very similar form, but the f s no longer preserves the prefix relation since the perfect recall assumption is dropped, so the modified input can no longer be computed incrementally: backtracking is necessary.
Application to games with states and colors
It is sometimes convenient, for intuition and succinctness, to define a winning condition not as a subset of the runs, but in several steps via states and colors. Given the current state, a pair of actions chosen by the players produces a color and determines the next state, and so on. The winning condition is then defined in terms of infinite sequences of colors.
Definition 2 An initialized arena is a tuple
• A 1 and A 2 are non-empty sets (of actions of Player 1 and Player 2),
• Q is a non-empty set (of states),
• q 0 ∈ Q (is the initial state),
• C is a non-empty set (of colors),
Providing an arena with some W ⊆ C ω (a winning condition for Player 1) defines a game.
The coloring function col is naturally extended to finite and infinite sequences over A 1 × A 2 . By induction, col ++ (ǫ) := ǫ, and col
The histories, strategies, and winning strategies of the game with states and colors are then defined as these of
, which is a game as defined in Section 2. Conversely, a game A 1 , A 2 , W may be seen as a game with states and colors A 1 , A 2 , Q, δ, C, col, W where C = A 1 × A 2 , and Q is a singleton {q 0 }, and col(q 0 , a, b) = (a, b).
Corollary 3 below considers games with states and colors. Corollary 3.1 (resp. 3.2) is a corollary of Theorem 1.1 (resp. Theorem 1.2). It says that if there is a winning strategy, there is also one that behaves the same after histories of pairs of actions that yield the same sequence of states (resp. the same current state) and the same sequence of colors. Note that no assumption is made on the winning condition in Corollary 3: it need not be even Borel.
Corollary 3 Consider a game with states and colors G = A 1 , A 2 , Q, q 0 , δ, C, col, W such that a player has a winning strategy s 0 . The two results below are independent.
1. Then she has a winning strategy s (obtained in a Lipschitz manner from s 0 ) that satisfies
Furthermore, if s 0 can be implemented via memory space M , so can s.
2. Then she has a winning strategy s (obtained in a Lipschitz manner from s 0 ) that satisfies
Furthermore, if s 0 can be implemented via memory M , then s can be implemented via memory size 2 |M |(|Q| 2 +1) .
On the one hand, Corollary 3 exemplifies the benefit of dropping the perfect recall assumption to obtain winning strategies that are significantly more uniform. On the other hand, it exemplifies the memory cost of doing so, which corresponds to the proof-theoretic complexification from Theorem 1.1 to Theorem 1.2, as will be discussed in later sections.
To prove Corollary 3.2 directly, a natural idea is to "copy-paste", i.e., rewrite the strategy at equivalent histories. If done finitely many times, it is easy to prove that the derived strategy is still winning, but things become tricky if done infinitely many times, as it should.
Note that in Corollary 3, assumptions and conclusions apply to both players: indeed, since no assumption is made on W , its complement satisfies all assumptions, too.
A consequence of Corollary 3 is that one could define state-color strategies as functions in (Q * × C * ) → A 1 or even (Q × C * ) → A 1 , while preserving existence of winning strategies. How much one would benefit from doing so depends on the context.
In Corollary 3 the exact sequence of colors matters, but in some cases from formal methods, the winning condition is invariant under shuffling of the color sequence. Corollary 4 below provides an example where Theorem 1 applies (but only to Player 1).
Corollary 4 Consider a game with states and colors G = A 1 , A 2 , Q, q 0 , δ, C, col, W with finite Q and C, and where W is defined as follows: let (C i ) i∈I be subsets of C, and let γ ∈ W if there exists i ∈ I such that all colors in C i occurs infinitely often in γ.
If Player 1 has a winning strategy, she has a finite-memory one that behaves the same if the current state and the mutli-set of seen colors are the same.
Variant with stronger assumptions and conclusions
This section proves Theorem 1.1 and Corollary 3.1, after a quick reminder about orders.
Total orders: A strict total/linear order is a transitive, total, irreflexive binary relation. Such relations are represented by <. The reflexive closure of < is denoted ≤.
Well-orders: A well-order is a strict total order < on some set Σ such that every non-empty subset of Σ has a mimimum with respect to <. Equivalently, it is a strict total order with no infinite descending chain x 0 > x 1 > x 2 > . . . .
Lexicographic orders: Let < be a strict total order over a set Σ. The lexicographic extensions of < to Σ * are defined by induction as follows: < 0 lex is the empty relation over Σ, and for all n ∈ N, u, v ∈ Σ n , and x, y ∈ Σ,
It is well-known that each < n lex is a strict total order, and even a well-order if < is a well-order. In this article only words of equal length will be compared lexicographically, so one may write < lex instead of < n lex when the context is clear. Proof [Proof of Theorem 1.1] Let s be a Player 1 strategy. Let < be a well-order over A 2 (by the well-ordering principle for infinite
} is non-empty, as witnessed by b, so it has a <-minimum since < is a well-order.) Informally, if Player 2 has played βb, Player 1 may pretend that he played βc(β, b) instead, a harmless approximation up to ∼. Note that
By (2) above, the function c provides an action representative for all ∼-equivalent actions after β. It is used incrementally below to provide representatives for sequences of actions. Let f s : A * 2 → A * 2 be defined by induction by f s (ǫ) := ǫ and f s (βb) := f s (β)c(f s (β), b). Informally, if Player 2 has played β, Player 1 will pretend that he played f s (β) instead, and she will play accordingly, using the same strategy s. Said otherwise, the new Player 1 strategy is s • f s . The maps s → f s and s → s • f s are 1-Lipschitz continuous. (If one knows s up to action sequences of length n, one knows f s and s • f s up to action sequences of length n.) Moreover, from the definition of f s , it clearly preserves the length and the prefix relation.
The formulas (3) and (4) below will be used several times in this proof.
Let us prove (4) below by induction on β.
For the base case, trivially ǫ = ǫ. For the inductive case,
H. and closedness by adding a suffix,
by folding the definition of h.
One completes the induction step by combining the above ∼-equivalence with Formula (3).
Proof that s • f s is winning if s is: Since f s preserves the length and the prefix relation, one can extend its domain and codomain to A ω 2 : for all β ∈ A ω 2 let f s (β) be the only sequence
by preservation of length and of the prefix relation ∼ h(s, f s (β ≤n )) by Formula (4),
If s is winning, h(s, f s (β)) ∈ W , and h(s • f s , β) ∈ W by weak W -closedness, so s • f s is also winning.
Proof that s • f s is a ∼-strategy: it suffices to prove the following, by induction on β.
Then from the conclusion (4) and (3), and by rewriting f s (β ′ ) with
The memory-aware implementation of s • f s : Let us assume that some (M, m 0 , σ, µ) is a memory-aware implementation of s, and that ∼ is recognized by an automaton A = ((A 1 × A 2 ) 2 , Q, q 0 , F, δ). A natural idea is, as β is being incrementally extended by Player 2, to keep track of both (interdependently) the strategy memory state via µ, and f s (β) via A, and to feed the former to σ.
Let m 0 := (m 0 , q 0 ) ∈ M × F , which will be the new initial memory state. Let M := M × F , and for all (m, q) ∈ M × F let σ(m, q) = σ(m). For the memory update, let
To see that µ is well-defined, check that c ′ (m, q, β) is well-defined: δ(q, (σ(m), b), (σ(m), b)) ∈ F due to closedness by adding a suffix and since q ∈ F by definition of M , so the set at hand is non-empty and has a <-minimum since < is a well-order. The aim is to prove that s • f s = σ • µ + . The main step is to prove the equation below, by induction on β. Then, it suffices to compose both sides of the equation with σ, to invoke σ(m, q) = σ(m) on the right-hand side, and to recall that s = σ • µ + by definition.
For the inductive case, let us first note that for all (β,
by unfolding the definition of h and by definition of δ + , = ∆(b, c) by rewriting twice s with σ • µ + , which is correct by definition,
where ∆(b, c) :
.
, which is written c ′′ for short. Therefore,
above, and by definition of f s . This completes the induction.
Let us comment on the proof of Theorem 1.1. First, the well-order < is only used to define a choice function for all non-empty subsets of A 2 , i.e. further order-theoretic properties are not used. Second, the key object derived from a strategy s is the representative function f s that helps build the sought strategy s • f s . The property that s • f s is winning (if s is) does not rely on ∼'s perfectly recalling, but the property that it is a ∼-strategy does.
Proof [Proof of Corollary 3.1] Let s be a Player 1 winning strategy. Let ∼ be the equivalence relation over (
. This ∼ is time-aware since, e.g. col ++ (ρ) = col ++ (ρ ′ ) implies |ρ| = |ρ ′ |. This ∼ is closed by adding a suffix: let us assume ρ ∼ ρ ′ , and let ρ ′′ ∈ (A 1 × A 2 ) * ; it is straightforward to show by induction on ρ ′′ that ρρ ′′ ∼ ρ ′ ρ ′′ . This ∼ is perfectly recalling:
and let us assume that ρ ≤n ∼ ρ ′ ≤n for all n ∈ N. In particular col
Recall that, by definition, the strategies in
are exactly the strategies in G, and that a strategy is winning in G iff it is winning in G ′ . So, by Theorem 1.1 applied to the game G ′ , s • f s is a winning ∼-strategy also in G.
Furthermore, there is a two-state automaton that recognizes ∼, by staying in {q 0 } = F until states or colors differ . So again by Theorem 1.1, s • f s uses the same memory as s.
Weaker assumptions and conclusions
This section proves the first part of Theorem 1.2, i.e. without memory awareness. From now on, perfect recall is no longer assumed. To compensate this, the assumption on weak W -closedness will be replaced with strong W -closedness. First, Proposition 5 below proves a result for finite A 2 . This assumption is dropped in the first part of Theorem 1.2, whose proof consists in replacing and expanding the last part of the proof of Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Consider a game A 1 , A 2 , W with finite A 2 and a constraint ∼ that is timeaware, closed by adding a suffix, and strongly W -closed.
Then there exists a self-map on the Player 1 strategies that is 1-Lipschitz continuous, maps strategies to ∼-strategies, and maps winning strategies to winning strategies.
Proof Let s be a Player 1 strategy. Let < be a strict total order over A 2 , and let the < n lex be its lexicographic extensions to the A n 2 , which are well-orders, as mentioned in Section 4. Note
Note that f s was define differently in the proof of Theorem 1.1, let alone that it had a different domain. The following property is easy to check.
Let us define a strategy s ′ such that h(s ′ , A * 2 ) ⊆h(s, A * 2 ) by induction on its argument: base case, note that h(s ′ , ǫ) = ǫ = h(s, ǫ) ∈h(s, A * 2 ) and let
by Property (6) and closedness by adding a suffix,
So h(s ′ , βb) ∈h(s, A * 2 ) and one can set s ′ (βb) := s • f s • h(s ′ , βb), which is well-defined since h(s ′ , βb) does not depends on s ′ (βb). This completes the induction. Note that the map s → s ′ is 1-Lipschitz continuous due to its inductive definition.
Furthermore, s ′ is a ∼-strategy: let β, β ′ ∈ A * 2 be such that h(s ′ , β) ∼ h(s ′ , β ′ ). Then
Now, let us assume that s is winning, i.e. h(s, A ω 2 ) ⊆ W , consider an arbitrary β ′ ∈ A ω 2 , and let
, and consider the tree induced by all the f s • h(s ′ , β ′ ≤n ) (and their prefixes): it is finitely branching since A 2 is finite, so by Koenig's Lemma this tree has an infinite branch. Said otherwise, there is β ∈ A ω 2 such that for all n ∈ N there is k ∈ N such that
Since ρ ∈ h(s, A ω 2 ) ⊆ W , also ρ ′ ∈ W by strong W -closedness. Therefore s ′ is winning, since β ′ was arbitrary.
Let us comment on the proof of Proposition 5. First, like for Theorem 1.1, the well-order < is only used to define a choice function, but this time for some non-empty subsets of A * 2 via its well-ordered extensions, namely the < n lex . Second, f s is now defined directly over A * 2 , i.e. not in an incremental fashion. Third, the sought strategy s ′ is defined inductively by s ′ (βb) := s•f s •h(s ′ , βb), i.e. not only on Player 2 action sequence (as in the proof of Theorem 1.1), but also on s ′ itself. Fourth, whereas h(s • f s , A * 2 ) ⊆ h(s, A * 2 ) in the proof of Theorem 1.1, now only h(s ′ , A * 2 ) ⊆h(s, A * 2 ) holds. Fifth, since the representatives are no longer prefixes of each other, they do no induce a canonical infinite representative. One retrieves one thanks to (weak) Koenig's Lemma, thus incurring a loss in terms of computability and constructivity. Sixth, the strong W -closedness seems to be needed, as opposed to the weak one. Indeed, in the induced infinite tree, there is no reason why there should exist an infinite branch with all (or even any) prefixes being original representatives. (E.g. the only infinite branch in the tree induced by the 0 n 1 is 0 ω .) Theorem 1.2, whose first part is proved below, drops the finiteness assumption for A 2 , so the proof can no longer rely on Koenig's Lemma.
Proof [Proof of Theorem 1.2 without memory awareness] The beginning of this proof is like the beginning of the proof of Proposition 5, apart from the sentence "Let < be a strict total order over A 2 ", which is replaced with the sentence "By the well-ordering principle (equivalent to the axiom of choice), let < be a well-order over A 2 ." More importantly, the last paragraph (starting with "Now, let us assume that s") is replaced with the remainder of this proof.
by definition of the < n lex . It is easy to invoke this to prove the following by induction on β ′ .
Next, let β ′ ∈ A ω 2 . By the above property, for all n ∈ N the sequence (f • h(s ′ , β ′ ≤n+k ) ≤n ) k∈N is ≤ n lex -non-increasing, so it is eventually constant from some index on, since < n lex is a wellorder. Let k n be the minimum such index. Thus, k n ≤ k n+1 for all n ∈ N. Let β(n) := f • h(s ′ , β ′ ≤n+kn ) ≤n . By definition of the k n , β(n) is a prefix of β(n + 1) for all n ∈ N, so the β(n) are the prefixes of a unique β ∈ A ω 2 .
, and let us show that h(s ′ , β ′ ) ∈ W by invoking strong W -closedness. On the one hand
so there exists γ(n) such that ρ ≤n γ(n) = δ(n), which implies that |γ(n)| = k n . On the other hand
, where the equivalence holds by Property (7) . So ρ ′ = h(s ′ , β ′ ) ∈ W since ρ = h(s, β) and by strong W -closedness. Since β ′ was arbitrary, s ′ is a winning strategy.
Let us compare the above proof of Theorem 1.2 without memory awareness with the proof of Proposition 5. First, it now invokes the axiom of choice, to obtain a well-order. Second, the well-order, which was obtained for free for finite A 2 , is no longer used only as a choice function: its lexicographic extensions, due to their interaction, ensure a convenient convergence. Third, Property (7) was not invoked in the last paragraph of the proof of Proposition 5, but is now involved in its replacement above.
Weaker assumptions and conclusions with memory-aware strategies
This section proves the part of Theorem 1.2 with memory awareness, gives an example where uniformatization necessarily increases the used memory, and proves Corollaries 3.2 and 4.
Proof [Proof of Theorem 1.2 with memory awareness] Let s be a Player 1 strategy with memory-aware implementation (M, m 0 , σ, µ). Defining a new strategy: Let < be a strict total order over M . Let ((A 1 ×A 2 ) 2 , Q, q 0 , F, δ) be an automaton recognizing time-aware ∼, and let us define a memory-aware implementation (M , m 0 , σ, µ) that depends on the above objects.
To see that σ is well-defined, note that
To argue that µ is well-defined, let (C, b) ∈ M × A 2 and let us show that
for some y ∈ M , and there exists q ′ ∈ F such that (y, q ′ ) ∈ C. By setting (x, q, b
On the other hand, δ(q ′ , (σ(y), b), (σ(y), b)) ∈ F by closedness by adding a suffix, so
Let s : A * 2 → A 1 be the strategy with memory-aware implementation (M , m 0 , σ, µ).
Connecting the local and the global: Let us show by induction on n that for all n ∈ N, for all β ∈ A n 2 ,
For the base case, µ + (ǫ) = {(m 0 , q 0 )} = {(µ + (ǫ), δ + (h(s, ǫ) h(s, ǫ)))}. For the inductive case,
by definition of µ and s,
+ and s, where q is as above,
+ , and h, thus completing the induction.
A straightforward induction would also show that µ + (β) ∈ M for all β ∈ A * 2 . In particular,
Proving that s is a ∼-strategy: First, let us show that for all n ∈ N and β, β
Let us assume that h(s, β) ∼ h(s, β ′ ). Then, for all x ∈ M ,
by Formula (8),
Let us now assume that h(s, β) ∼ h(s, β ′ ) for some β, β ′ ∈ A n 2 . Then
by Implication (9), = s(β ′ ) for similar reasons as above, invoked in reverse order.
Proving that s is a winning strategy (if s is): let us assume that s is winning. Let β ∈ A ω 2 . The remainder shows that h(s, β) ∈ W . For all n ∈ N, since µ
Consider the tree induced by the β n (and their prefixes). It is finitely branching since A 2 is finite, and it is infinite since each β n has length n. So by Koenig's Lemma it has an infinite branch β, i.e. for all n ∈ N there exists k n ∈ N such that β ≤n = β n+kn ≤n . So for all n ∈ N there exists γ(n) such that h(s, β ≤n )γ(n) = h(s, β n+|γ(n)| ).
Let ρ := h(s, β) ∈ W and ρ ′ := h(s, β). So for all n ∈ N, ρ ≤n γ(n) = h(s, β ≤n )γ(n) = h(s, β n+|γ(n)| ) ∼ h(s, β ≤n ) = ρ ′ ≤n , respectively by definition of ρ, by definition of γ(n), by (10), and by definition of ρ ′ . So by strong W -closedness, h(s, β) = ρ ′ ∈ W . Since β was arbitrary, s is a winning strategy.
Let us comment on the above proof. First, the memory size is P(M s × M ∼ ) so there is an exponential blow-up compared to M s × F ∼ from Theorem 1.1. Second, whereas the memoryaware part of Theorem 1.1 was built on its memory-unaware part, "simply" by implementing s • f s , the above proof has to start from scratch since s ′ has no reason to be implementable with a small memory. Indeed, in the first part of Theorem 1.2 the choice of one representative for each opponent-history requires backtracking that relies on a new f s which has no reason to be computationally easy to handle. A new, suitable strategy is thus defined by combining elements of the implementation of s and of ∼. Third, finiteness of A 2 was assumed in Proposition 5 but not in its improvement in Theorem 1.2. The proof was strengthened by replacing Koenig's Lemma with an argument involving lexicographic well-orders. I failed to do the same for the memory-aware part of Theorem 1.2.
Proof [Proof of Corollary 3.2] Let s be a Player 1 winning strategy. Let ∼ be an equivalence relation over (
This ∼ is closed by adding a suffix: let us assume ρ ∼ ρ ′ , and let ρ ′′ ∈ (A 1 × A 2 ) * ; it is straightforward to show by induction on ρ ′′ that ρρ ′′ ∼ ρ ′ ρ ′′ .
Let us show that ∼ is strongly W -closed. Let ρ, ρ ′ ∈ (A 1 × A 2 ) ω be such that for all n ∈ N there exists γ ∈ (A 1 × A 2 ) * such that ρ ≤n γ ∼ ρ ′ ≤n+|γ| , implying col ++ (ρ ≤n γ) = col ++ (ρ ′ ≤n+k ), and col
are exactly the strategies in G, and that a strategy is winning in G iff it is winning in G ′ . So, by Theorem 1.2 applied to the game G ′ , there exists a winning ∼-strategy in G.
For the memory, it suffices to show that ∼ is pairwise-regular via an automaton with |Q| 2 + 1 states. Let q −1 / ∈ Q be a failure state and let us define the automaton (
Proof [Proof of Corollary 4] The game G is a Muller game, so, by [7] , Player 1 who has a winning strategy also has a finite-memory one. Let a constraint ∼ be defined by ρ ∼ ρ ′ if the multisets induced by col ++ (ρ) and col ++ (ρ ′ ) are equal. Let us prove useful properties of ∼ below.
Figure 1: Absence of small winning ∼-strategies
• Closedness by adding a suffix: if ρ ∼ ρ ′ then col ++ (ρ) and col ++ (ρ ′ ) induce the same multisets, and so do col ++ (ρρ ′′ ) and col
• Strong W -closedness: Let ρ ∈ W and
, so for all n ∈ N, there exists k ∈ N, such that every color occurring in col ++ (ρ ≤n ) occurs at least as many times in col ++ (ρ ′ ≤k ). Since ρ ∈ W , there exists some C i such that all the elements of C i occur infinitely often in col ∞ (ρ), and also in col ∞ (ρ ′ ) by the above remark, so ρ ′ ∈ W .
Therefore, by Theorem 1.2, Player 1 has a winning finite-memory ∼-strategy.
Example 6 below shows a game with a winning strategy smaller than all winning ∼-strategies. The game is morally turn-based and finite but expressed in the general formalism.
Example 6 Let A 1 = A 2 = {0, 1}. Let Player 1 win if she plays in the third round what Player 2 had played in the first round, or if Player 2 plays 01 or 10 in the first two rounds. Let ∼ be the smallest constraint generated by ( , 0)( , 1) ∼ ( , 1)( , 0) and closed by adding a suffix. The underscore above means anything in {0, 1}, quantified universally, i.e. (x, 0)(y, 1) ∼ (z, 1)(t, 0) for all x, y, z, t ∈ {0, 1}. This ∼ is also time-aware and strongly W -closed. One can implement a winning strategy using the left-hand side automaton in Figure 1 , since it suffices to remember whether Player 2 played 0 or 1 in the first round. But intuitively, implementing a winning ∼-strategy requires to remember the two actions of Player 2 to detect 01 and 10 and react similarly for both, as in the right-hand side of Figure 1 .
Comparison between used and alternative concepts
This section first compares the two notions of regularity discussed in the introduction: pairwise regularity, used in this article, and single-wise regularity. Second, it compares strong W -closedness, weak W -closedness, and perfect recall in several ways.
Proposition 7 below shows that, if considering time-aware equivalence relations, the concept of pairwise regularity is more general than the concept of single-wise regularity. So this article uses the former to obtain stronger results. The time-aware restriction ∼ ta of an equivalence relation ∼ is defined by ρ ∼ ta ρ ′ iff ρ ∼ ρ ′ and |ρ| = |ρ ′ |.
Proposition 7
1. If an equivalence relation is single-wise regular using memory Q (to build an automaton recognizing it), so is its time-aware restriction, using memory Q 2 . 2. Every time-aware equivalence relation over Σ * is pairwise regular using memory Σ * .
3. Every single-wise regular equivalence relation is closed by adding a suffix.
4. There exists a pairwise-regular equivalence relation that is closed by adding a suffix and uses finite memory, but is not the time-aware restriction of any single-wise regular equivalence relation using finite memory.
Proof
1. Let ∼ be a single-wise regular equivalence relation, and let (Σ, Q, q 0 , δ) be a corresponding automaton. Let A := (Σ 2 , Q 2 , (q 0 , q 0 ), F, δ 2 ), where F := {(q, q) | q ∈ Q} and δ 2 (q 1 , q 2 , a 1 , a 2 ) := (δ(q 1 , a 1 ), δ(q 2 , a 2 )) for all q 1 , q 2 ∈ Q and a 1 , a 2 ∈ Σ. It is easy to check that for all u, v ∈ Σ * of equal length, δ 3. Reading the same word after reaching the same state leads to the same state.
4. Let ∼ be defined by 0 n ∼ 0 n and 0 n 1u ∼ 0 n 1v for all n ∈ N and u, v ∈ {0, 1} * such that |u| = |v|. It is closed by adding a suffix. The automaton depicted in Figure 2 witnesses that ∼ is pairwise-regular. (Formally, the automaton is ({0, 1} 2 , {q 0 , q 1 , q 2 }, q 0 , {q 0 , q 1 }, δ), where δ(q 0 , 0, 0) = q 0 , δ(q 0 , 1, 1) = q 1 , δ(q 0 , 0, 1) = δ(q 0 , 1, 0) = q 2 , and δ(q i , , ) = q i for i ∈ {1, 2}.) The words of length n are partitioned into n + 1 equivalence classes, so the relation ∼ is not the time-aware restriction of any single-wise regular relation using finite memory, since the latter would have finitely many equivalence classes.
For the remainder of this section, let A 1 , A 2 , W be a game and ∼ be a constraint. In addition to comparing strong and weak W -closedness, let us define a notion lying in between, as will be proved, and used by a tightness result in Section 8. The constraint ∼ is said to be
. Proposition 8 below shows that the assumption of time awareness is done without loss of generality in the following sense: if ∼ satisfies all the requirements of Theorem 1 but time awareness, its time-aware restriction satisfies all requirements. The proofs are straightforward.
Proposition 8
1. If ∼ is closed by adding a suffix, so is its time-aware restriction ∼ ta .
2. If ∼ is perfectly recalling, so is its time-aware restriction ∼ ta .
3. If ∼ is (strongly, weakly) W -closed, so is its time-aware restriction ∼ ta .
Proposition 9 below justifies the attributes strong and weak for W -closedness.
Proposition 9 Strong W -closedness implies W -closedness, which implies weak W -closedness. Furthermore, the converse implications are false even under assumption of time awareness and closedness by adding a suffix.
Proof It is straightforward to show that W -closedness implies weak W -closedness. Consider some ∼ that is strongly W -closed, and let ρ, ρ ′ ∈ (A 1 × A 2 ) ω be such that for all n ∈ N there is k ∈ N such that ρ ≤n+k ∼ ρ ′ ≤n+k . Using such n and k, let γ(n) be such that ρ ≤n γ(n) = ρ ≤n+k , so ρ ≤n γ(n) ∼ ρ ′ ≤n+|γ(n)| . So ρ ∈ W ⇒ ρ ′ ∈ W by strong W -closedness. By swapping ρ and ρ ′ , one obtains ρ ′ ∈ W ⇒ ρ ∈ W and the equivalence, so ∼ is W -closed.
To show that weak W -closedness does not imply W -closedness, let A 1 = {0, 1} and A 2 = {0} and let ρ ∼ ρ ′ iff |ρ| = |ρ ′ | and
. This ∼ is time-aware by definition, and it is clearly closed by adding a suffix. Furthermore, ∼ is weakly W -closed regardless of W since (∀n ∈ N, ρ ≤n ∼ ρ ′ ≤n ) implies ρ = ρ ′ . This is proved by showing ∀n ∈ N, ρ ≤n = ρ ′ ≤n by induction on n. Now let W = {ρ} where ρ := ((0, 0)(1, 0)) ω , and let
To show that W -closedness does not imply strong W -closedness, let A 1 = {0, 1} and A 2 = {0} and let ρ ∼ ρ ′ iff |ρ| = |ρ ′ | and either ρ = ρ ′ = (0, 0) |ρ| or they are both different from (0, 0) |ρ| . This ∼ is time-aware by definition, and it is also clearly closed by adding a suffix. Let W := {(0, 0) ω }. Then, ∼ is W -closed: let ρ and ρ ′ be such that for all n ∈ N there exists k ∈ N such that ρ ≤n+k ∼ ρ ′ ≤n+k . Then either the two of them are in (0, 0) * , or 1 occurs in each of them, so ρ ∈ W ⇔ ρ ′ ∈ W . However, ∼ is not strongly W -closed: let ρ := (0, 0) ω and ρ ′ := (1, 0) ω , and γ := (1, 0). Thus, for all n ∈ N we have ρ ≤n γ = (0, 0) n (1, 0) ∼ (1, 0) n+1 = ρ ′ ≤n+|γ| , yet ρ ∈ W and ρ ′ / ∈ W .
Proposition 10 below show that the implications of Proposition 9 are equivalences under perfect recall. This already suggests that perfect recall is a strong assumption.
Proposition 10 A perfectly recalling, weakly W -closed constraint is also strongly W -closed.
Proof Let ∼ be perfectly recalling and weakly W -closed. So ρ ∼ ρ ′ ⇒ ∀n ≤ |ρ|, ρ ≤n ∼ ρ ≤n and (∀n ∈ N,
≤n for all n ∈ N. Therefore ρ ∼ ρ ′ by weak W -closedness.
Tightness results
This section shows tightness results for Theorem 1. Dropping perfect recall falsifies Theorem 1.1. Dropping either time awareness or closedness by adding a suffix, or weakening strong W -closedness into W -closedness falsifies Theorem 1.2. Despite this relative tightness, the end of the section shows well-known examples that are not captured by Theorem 1.2. Given a game with a Player 1 winning strategy, given a constraint ∼, if there is no Player 1 winning ∼-strategies, then ∼ is said to be harmful. Otherwise it is said to be harmless.
Proposition 11 below shows that perfect recall cannot be simply dropped in Theorem 1.1.
Proposition 11
There exist a game {0, 1}, {0, 1}, W and a constraint that is time-aware, closed by adding a suffix, weakly W -closed, and yet harmful.
Proof Let W be defined as follows:
(This is morally a three-round turn-based game.) Let us define ∼ as follows: for all ρ, ρ ′ ∈ ({0, 1} 2 ) * such that
So, ∼ is time-aware by definition, it is clearly closed by adding a suffix, and also weakly W -closed.
(0, 0)(1, 1) ∼ (1, 1)(0, 0) but after (0, 0)(1, 1) Player 1 must play 1 to win, and after (1, 1)(0, 0) she must play 0 to win. So there is no winning ∼-strategy.
Proposition 12 below shows that time awareness cannot be simply dropped in Theorem 1.2.
Proposition 12 There exist a game {0, 1}, {0}, W and a constraint that is closed by adding a suffix, strongly W -closed, and yet harmful.
Proof
Let W be the set of runs such that Player 1 plays both 0 and 1 infinitely often, and let two histories ρ, ρ ′ ∈ ({0, 1} × {0}) * be ∼-equivalent if Player 1 has played 1 the same number of times. (Morally, it is a one-player game.)
This ∼ is clearly closed by adding a suffix. Let us argue that it is also strongly W -closed. Let ρ ∈ W and ρ ′ ∈ ({0, 1} × {0}) ω be such that ∀n ∈ N, ∃γ ∈ ({0, 1} × {0}) * , ρ ≤n γ ∼ ρ ′ ≤n+|γ| . This implies that for all n ∈ N, ρ ′ involves at least as many 0's and as many 1's as ρ ≤n . So ρ ′ involves infinitely many 0's and 1's, so it is in W .
Player 1 can win by playing 0 and 1 alternately, but any ∼-strategy always prescribes 0 after the first time it prescribes 0, since the number of occurrences of 1 will then remain the same. So Player 1 plays 1 either always or only finitely many times, which is not winning.
Proposition 13 below shows that the assumption of closedness by adding a suffix cannot be simply dropped in Theorem 1.2.
Proposition 13
There exist a game {0, 1}, {0, 1}, W and a constraint that is time-aware, strongly W -closed, and yet harmful.
Proof Let W := ( , 0)(0, )({0, 1} 2 ) ω ∪( , 1)(1, )({0, 1} 2 ) ω , where the underscore means either 0 or 1. Said otherwise, for Player 1 to win, her second action should imitate Player 2's first action. This is morally a two-round turn-based game. Let ∼ be defined by ( , ) ∼ (0, 0) and ( , 0)(0, )u ∼ ( , 1)(1, )v and ( , 1)(0, )u ∼ ( , 0)(1, )v for all u, v ∈ ({0, 1} 2 ) * such that |u| = |v|.
The definition of ∼ ensures time awareness. Let us argue that it is also strongly W -closed. Let ρ ∈ W , and let ρ ′ ∈ ({0, 1} 2 ) ω be such that ∀n ∈ N, ∃γ ∈ ({0, 1} 2 ) * , ρ ≤n γ ∼ ρ ′ ≤n+|γ| . For n := 2 this assumption provides some γ such that ρ ≤2 γ ∼ ρ ′ ≤2+|γ| . Since ρ ∈ W , ρ ≤2 matches ( , 0)(0, ) or ( , 1)(1, ), and so does ρ ′ ≤2 by definition of ∼, so ρ ′ ∈ W . Clearly Player 1 has a winning strategy for this game, but every ∼-strategy prescribes the same action after ( , 0) and ( , 1), which is not winning. Proposition 14 below shows that one cannot simply weaken the assumption of strong Wclosedness into W -closedness in Theorem 1.2.
Proposition 14
There exist a game {0, 1}, {0, 1, 2}, W and a constraint that is time-aware, closed by adding a suffix, W -closed, and yet harmful.
Proof
Let C := {0, 1} × {0, 1, 2} and let us define W below, where the underscore means anything in {0, 1, 2}, and ρC ω denotes the infinite sequences in C ω with prefix ρ ∈ C * , and (0, 0) + = (0, 0)(0, 0) * , and (0, 2) + = (0, 2)(0, 2) * .
Player 1 has a winning strategy in this game: play 0 in the first round; then, if Player 2 has also played 0 in the first round, play 0 in the second round and 1 in the third round; otherwise, keep playing 0 until Player 2 plays 0 or 1 in some round n; if he has played 1, play 0 in round n + 1, then 1 in round n + 2.
Let ∼ be defined by (0, 0) n+1 ρ ∼ (0, 2) n (0, 1)ρ for all n ∈ N and ρ ∈ C * , and by reflexive and symmetric closures. This ∼ is transitive for free, so it is an equivalence relation. By construction, ∼ is time-aware and closed by adding a suffix. Let us argue that it is also Wclosed. Let ρ, ρ ′ ∈ C ω be such that for all n ∈ N there exists k ∈ N such that ρ ≤n+k ∼ ρ ′ ≤n+k , and let us make a case disjunction. First case, ρ = ρ ′ , and clearly ρ ∈ W ⇔ ρ ′ ∈ W . Second case, ρ = ρ ′ , so there exists n ∈ N such that, up to swapping ρ and ρ ′ , we have ρ ≤n = (0, 0) n+1 and ρ ′ ≤n = (0, 2) n (0, 1), and ρ = (0, 0) n+1 ρ ′′ and ρ ′ = (0, 2) n (0, 1)ρ ′′ for some ρ ′′ ∈ C ω . If this ρ ′′ starts with (0, )(1, ), both ρ and ρ ′ are in W ; and otherwise both are not in W .
Let s be a Player 1 winning strategy. If s(2 n ) = s(2 . . . 2) = 1 for some n ∈ N, consider the minimal such n, so that h(s, 2 n+1 ) = (0, 2) n (1, 2), and no infinite continuation of this history is in W , contradiction. So s(2 n ) = 0 for all n ∈ N, so h(s, 2 n ) = (0, 2) n for all n ∈ N. Therefore, by inspecting W one sees that s(2 n 1) = 0 for all n ∈ N, so h(s, 2 n 1) = (0, 2) n (0, 1) for all n ∈ N. Now, if s(0 n ) = 0 for all n ∈ N, it is straightforward to show that h(s, 0 ω ) = (0, 0) ω / ∈ W . So let n be minimal such that s(0 n ) = 1, so h(s, 0 n ) = (0, 0) n . By inspecting W again, one sees that n ≥ 2, and h(s, 2 n−1 1) = (0, 2) n−1 (0, 1) ∼ (0, 0) n = h(s, 0 n ). On the other hand, s(2 n−1 1) = 0 = 1 = s(0 n ), contradiction.
Note that Proposition 14 essentially implies Proposition 11 but is harder to prove. (And requiring A 2 = {0, 1} would make it tedious to prove.)
Limitations and opportunity for meaningful generalizations Despite its relative tightness, Theorem 1 does not imply all known results that can be seen as instances of strategy uniformatization problems, so there is room for meaningful generalizations. E.g., due to time awareness requirement, Theorem 1 does not imply positional determinacy of parity games [5, 14] , where two histories are equivalent if they lead to the same state. Nor does it imply countable compactness of first-order logic [6] , which is also an instance of a uniformatization problem: Let (ϕ n ) n∈N be first-order formulas, and define a turn-based game: Spoiler plays only at the first round by choosing m ∈ N. Then Verifier gradually builds a countable structure over the signature of (ϕ n ) n∈N . More specifically, at every round she either chooses the value of a variable, or the output value of a function at a given input value, or the Boolean value of a relation for a given pair of values. Only countably many pieces of information are needed to define the structure, and one can fix an order (independent of m) in which they are provided. Verifier wins if the structure she has defined is a model of ∧ 0≤k≤m ϕ k . Let all histories of equal length be ∼-equivalent. Compactness says that if each ∧ 0≤k≤m ϕ k has a model, so does ∧ 0≤k ϕ k . Said otherwise, if Verifier has a winning strategy, she has a winning ∼-strategy, i.e. independent of Spoiler's first move. Proposition 17 There exists a game N, N, W with clopen W and a Player 1 winning strategy, but no maximal harmless constraint.
Consider the game N, N, W where Player 1 wins iff her pick in the second round is greater than Player 2's pick in the first round. W is clopen, and the game amounts to a tworound turn-based game. The Player 1 strategy consisting in picking n + 1, where n was Player 2's pick, is clearly winning. Let a constraint ∼ be such that there exists a winning ∼-strategy s.
Since s is winning, n < s(n) for all n ∈ N. In particular s(0) < s(s(0)), so the ∼-classes of (s(ǫ), 0) and (s(ǫ), s(0)) are distinct since s is a ∼-strategy. Let ∼ ′ be defined by merging these two classes, so that ∼ ′ is strictly greater than ∼. Let us derive a new Player 1 strategy s ′ as follows: s ′ (ρ) := s(s(0)) if ρ ∼ (s(ǫ), 0), and s ′ (ρ) := s(ρ) otherwise. Thus, s ′ is a Player 1 winning ∼ ′ -strategy.
The action sets in Proposition 17 are infinite. Proposition 18 below also shows that there may not be any maximal harmless constraint, but with a finite action set for Player 2. This is done at the cost of a slight set-theoretic complexification of the winning condition, which is still closed but no longer open. The benefit is that Proposition 18 shows the tightness of both Theorem 16.2 and 16.3.
Proposition 18
There exists a game N, {0, 1}, W , where W is a non-open closed set, and there is a Player 1 winning strategy, but no maximal harmless constraint.
Proof
Consider the game N, {0, 1}, W , where a run is in W iff it satisfies the following: if Player 2 always picks 1, Player 1 wins; otherwise, the round after the first time that Player 2 picks 0, Player 1 must pick a number greater than the number of 1 that have been picked by Player 2 so far. W is closed but not open, the latter can be either checked directly or later inferred from Theorem 16.3. Let a constraint ∼ be such that there exists a winning ∼-strategy s. Since s is winning, n < s(1 n 0) for all n ∈ N. In particular, s(0) < s(1 s(0) 0), so the ∼-classes of (s(ǫ), 0) and h(s, 1 s(0) 0) are distinct since s is a ∼-strategy. Let ∼ ′ be defined by merging these two classes, so that ∼ ′ is strictly greater than ∼. Let us derive a new Player 1 strategy s ′ as follows: s ′ (ρ) := s(1 s(0) 0) if ρ ∼ (s(ǫ), 0), and s ′ (ρ) := s(ρ) otherwise. Thus, s ′ is a winning ∼ ′ -strategy.
